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Claiming Sovereignty in the Oil Crisis “Project 
Independence” and Global Interdependence  
in the United States, 1973/74  
Rüdiger Graf ∗ 
Abstract: »Souveränitätsbehauptungen in der Ölkrise. ‚Project Independence‘ 
und globale Interdependenz in den USA 1973/74«. Understanding sovereignty 
as a claim and not a property, the article scrutinizes how the US government 
under Nixon countered the challenge that emerged from the oil embargo and 
oil price increases in 1973/74. Using a distinction made by Stephen D. Krasner, 
it holds that the embargo challenged US international sovereignty by establish-
ing the limits of its interdependence sovereignty, which was supposed to under-
mine its domestic sovereignty. The article examines how the Nixon administration 
tried to both maintain and demonstrate its sovereignty by institutional reorgani-
zation, the development of state energy expertise, direct communication with the 
public, and diplomatic negotiations with both producing and fellow consuming 
countries. Thus, it looks at the politics of sovereignty under the conditions of a 
highly interdependent globalized economy, modern mass communication, and 
the rising importance of expert knowledge in political decision-making. 
Keywords: Oil crisis, sovereignty, Nixon, energy policy, United States, 1970s, 
international relations. 
1.  Introduction 
When, in October 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) unilaterally raised the price of oil and the Organization of Arab Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) simultaneously reduced oil production and 
embargoed the United States and the Netherlands, the effects were felt 
throughout the world. The first oil crisis was part of a process in which a num-
ber of oil producing countries achieved “permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources,” making real a claim that had been put forward by the so-called 
Third World since the early 1960s. After attaining national independence in the 
process of decolonization, political elites in the developing world had realized 
that political sovereignty meant very little if they could not control their eco-
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nomic affairs.1 Their gains in sovereignty had far-reaching repercussions: the 
multinational oil companies lost control over pricing and oil production in 
several countries, and the oil price increases and production cuts challenged 
sovereignty in Western industrialized countries.  
Since Jean Bodin defined the term, “sovereignty” has traditionally signified 
a supreme form of power over a certain territory that is independent of external 
control or interference. At the beginning of the twentieth century, according to 
Lassa Francis Oppenheim, a state required a territory, a people, and a sovereign 
government:  
Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any 
other earthly authority. Sovereignty in the strict and narrowest sense of the 
term includes, therefore, independence all around, within and without the bor-
ders of the country.2 
The concept of sovereignty, thus, connects the spheres of international and 
domestic politics; it is usually in reference to the state, but it can also be as-
cribed to governments that have the authority to exert sovereign rights. Over 
the course of the twentieth century, the principle of national sovereignty gained 
almost universal acceptance with the destruction of imperial systems, as well as 
with the rise of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Yet, at least 
since the 1960s, the viability of the concept has fallen into doubt. Increasing 
economic interdependence and the rise of multinational corporations seems to 
have weakened governments’ abilities to conduct autonomous economic poli-
cies.3 Moreover, the growth of international organizations and legal regimes 
were supposed to have circumscribed individual states’ sovereignty. Many 
political scientists, sociologists, legal scholars, and historians diagnosed either 
the loss of “sovereignty” or its transfer to supranational levels.4 Others saw the 
“rescue of the nation state” via supranational integration or even an increase in 
sovereignty due to new means of technological surveillance and control.5 De-
spite the differences, all of these narratives understand “sovereignty” as a prop-
erty that states either possess or do not – sometimes allowing for different 
degrees of sovereignty. This conceptualization, however, neglects that, at its 
origin, sovereignty is a claim that legitimizes one form of authority while de-
bunking others.6 Understanding sovereignty as a claim, and not property, 
means that it is a social concept and has an inherently communicative and 
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symbolic dimension.7 Being sovereign, above all, means to be recognized as 
sovereign and, thus, sovereignty can be questioned, challenged, contested, and 
denied, as well as asserted or demonstrated. Due to its communicative dimen-
sion, claiming sovereignty can be the first step towards establishing it. But, in 
the end, it can be established only practically.  
Examining the oil crisis of 1973/74 as a challenge to sovereignty helps us 
understand its dynamics and the multiple reactions of Western European and 
US governments. Of course, one may hold the view that the “oil weapon” was 
not powerful enough to really threaten the sovereignty of Western industrial-
ized countries, but this does not mean it was not perceived as threatening. Us-
ing a conceptual differentiation made by Steven D. Krasner, I will argue that 
even if the consuming countries’ “Westphalian sovereignty” was never an issue 
during the oil crisis, the embargo challenged their “international legal sover-
eignty” trying to pressure the governments to assume a certain position with 
respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict.8 It did so by establishing the limits of their 
“interdependence sovereignty,” as they were apparently not capable of ascer-
taining the sufficient influx of oil into the country. This, in turn, challenged 
“domestic sovereignty” in the Western world: the post-war economic boom of 
the 1950s and 60s had depended on the availability of cheap and abundant 
energy resources – above all, oil. Accordingly, prosperity seemed to be threat-
ened when oil appeared to become scarce and prices rose. Moreover, the trans-
fer of sovereignty towards the producing countries seemed to jeopardize the 
very foundations of Western democratic institutions, as, especially in the light 
of the Cold War, legitimatization of liberal democracies had depended on 
growing affluence among their citizens.9 Therefore, the oil crisis amounted to a 
crisis of sovereignty and political authority for Western governments and was 
ideally suited to formulate and challenge sovereignty claims.  
While this was true for all industrialized countries affected by the price in-
creases and production cuts, the predicament in the United States, on which I 
will concentrate, was special. Presidential authority to exert sovereign rights 
had increased since World War II at the expense of Congress.10 With the simul-
taneous rise of a “media democracy,” however, public scrutiny of the presi-
dents also grew. Thus, the number of potential pitfalls that could result in an 
erosion of authority increased. This was even more the case as the president 
was seen as a source of moral leadership and guidance, and presidents were 
expected to live up to their self-proclaimed standards.11 When the oil crisis 
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occurred, however, Nixon’s presidential authority and moral integrity had 
already been called into question because of the Vietnam War and the Wa-
tergate scandal. In the following, I will scrutinize the Nixon administration’s 
response to the challenge to sovereignty – or, rather, I will show how and why 
certain aspects of the oil crisis in 1973/74 were perceived as matters of sover-
eignty. Using Krasner’s differentiation, I will argue that the US government 
tried to demonstrate and augment its domestic sovereignty in the field of ener-
gy by (1) institutional reorganization and (2) the use of expert knowledge, 
specifically the development of state expertise. Furthermore, I examine (3) how 
the government’s direct communication with the public shows its awareness of 
the symbolic challenge the oil crisis posed to national sovereignty. Finally, I 
will show that (4) diplomatic communication with both producing and fellow 
consuming countries was the most concrete means to secure and demonstrate 
US international and interdependence sovereignty. In examining US energy 
policy during the first oil crisis, which is often described as a critical juncture 
in the history of the Western world, this article scrutinizes the politics of sover-
eignty under the conditions of a highly interdependent globalized economy, 
modern mass communication, and the rising importance of expert knowledge 
in political decision-making.12  
2.  Domestic Sovereignty via Institutional Reorganization  
Contrary to a widely held belief, energy supply problems in the United States 
did not begin with the oil crisis of 1973/74.13 In the preceding winter, the fuel 
situation had already become critical: kerosene became scarce in Maine and 
Virginia, people in Iowa suffered heating problems, and the city of Boston was 
unable to find a contractor willing to deliver gasoline for the city’s vehicle 
fleet.14 In the following summer holiday season, thousands of independent gas 
stations ran out of fuel. The Financial Times was among the media outlets that 
declared the nation was facing an “energy crisis.”15 In fact, in the years before 
the oil crisis, energy supply problems occurred frequently, and talk of an ener-
gy crisis had already become ubiquitous in the media.16 In June 1973, four 
months before the Arab oil embargo and OPEC price increases, 83 percent of 
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Americans declared they had already heard of the “energy crisis.”17 This energy 
crisis shaped public perception and politics during the oil crisis, as it had initi-
ated a restructuring of US energy policy.  
By the late 1960s, most Western energy experts, such as those in the 
OECD’s Oil Policy Committee, shared the view that the global energy econo-
my was undergoing significant changes. They attributed these transformations, 
above all, to the unexpectedly fast-rising oil consumption in industrialized 
countries and to the increasing demands of the producing countries to control 
their resources.18 Despite its ample oil reserves and status as the world’s largest 
oil producer, even the United States’ situation was considered worrisome in the 
early 1970s. Oil imports exceeded domestic spare production capacity, and the 
Texas Railroad Commission abolished the production restrictions on US oil 
fields, which had been introduced in order to stabilize prices.19 In the second 
half of the 1950s, oil import quotas had been introduced for national security 
reasons, as well as to protect the domestic oil industry from cheaper competi-
tion. In 1970, Richard Nixon’s Task Force on Oil Import Control suggested 
that the system should be substituted by tariffs in order to secure America’s 
growing energy needs.20 Despite of or due to various government interventions 
in the oil and energy markets – most prominently the price controls on petrole-
um products in 1971, which were later abolished under President Carter – local 
energy supply problems increased. Together with the expectation of a coming 
energy crunch, they created a sense of crisis that seemed to necessitate further 
government action. Something had to be done to prove that the government 
was in control and able to solve the problem.21 Many energy experts, as well as 
both Republicans and Democrats, argued that energy competences were too 
dispersed, with various governmental agencies responsible for single energy 
sources, and called for centralization.22  
In his address to Congress in June of 1971, Nixon had demanded the Federal 
government’s energy authority be strengthened with an energy program and a 
Department of Natural Resources, as “a single agency that can execute and 
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modify policies in a comprehensive and unified manner.”23 In 1973, months 
before the oil embargo, the restructuring of energy authorities gained momen-
tum. In June the short-lived and inefficient National Energy Office was re-
placed with the Energy Policy Office under the guidance of Nixon’s first “en-
ergy czar,” the Republican Governor of Colorado, John A. Love.24 In naming 
him “czar,” Nixon used a notion that, in American politics, had signified the 
endowment of somebody with unlimited authority over a certain policy field in 
order to strengthen the government, usually in times of war. Justifying his 
decision, Nixon pointed to a deficiency of the federal government: while “the 
acquisition, distribution, and consumption of energy resources […were] critical 
to the functioning of our economy and our society,” the government could not 
“effectively meet its obligations in these areas under the present organizational 
structures.”25 Therefore, the competences of various departments and govern-
ment agencies should be centralized within the new office. The energy czar’s 
powers, however, were not as supreme and absolute as his name suggested; 
rather, the often hectic restructuring of energy authorities over the course of 
1973 led to parallel structures and power conflicts.26 Love’s office soon came 
into conflict with the Oil Policy Committee, which was headed by William E. 
Simon, a former banker at Salomon Brothers, who had joined the Treasury only 
in January 1973. Over the course of 1973 and, especially after the beginning of 
the embargo in October, Simon rose to become the central figure for the con-
duct of US energy policy. When he replaced Love as the new energy czar, 
Nixon emphasized again the need for further government control of the energy 
sector, giving Simon significant authority, while claiming to participate per-
sonally in the conduct of energy policy.27  
The already existing government interventions in the energy sector, particu-
larly the price control and the mandatory allocation program of November 
1973, necessitated further intervention and the construction of a bureaucracy.28 
Despite portraying himself as an anti-bureaucratic businessman, Simon quickly 
built up the Federal Energy Office (FEO), which soon had more than one thou-
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sand employees.29 Lack of clarity over authorities remained a problem, even 
when the FEO was turned into the Federal Energy Agency in June 1974. An 
Energy Policy Committee had to be formed in order to coordinate the work of 
the relevant agencies.30 The reorganization was so chaotic that parts of Love’s 
Energy Policy Office continued to exist long after it had lost all its functions.31 
Yet, despite these frequent changes, improvisations, and shortcomings, the 
institutional rearrangements formed the basis for the later institutionalization of 
the Department of Energy under Jimmy Carter and contributed to the formation 
of energy as unified field of policy. However imperfect the centralization of 
energy competences under one institutional roof was, it was driven by two 
closely interrelated goals. First, it was supposed to expand the government’s 
authority in the realm of energy in a fast-changing international environment to 
secure domestic sovereignty. Secondly, the measures were to demonstrate the 
US government’s ability to solve the mounting energy crisis to the broader 
public and to the governments of oil producing and consuming countries. This 
symbolic dimension was crucial, as the perceived capacity to change domestic 
policies influenced the international bargaining position and the capacity to 
maintain international sovereignty.  
3.  The Paradoxes of Energy Expertise and “Project 
Independence” 
The most important factor that seemed to restrict the government’s sovereignty 
and its capacity to implement energy policies, which undermined the public’s 
trust in its political leadership, was the apparent lack of government expertise 
in the field of energy. Indeed, on the eve of the oil crisis, even central protago-
nists of US energy policy were not well informed about the energy situation. A 
little more than a week before the declaration of the oil embargo and produc-
tion cuts in October 1973, John A. Love, still head of the Energy Policy Office, 
held a press conference with the director of the Atomic Energy Commission, 
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Dixy Lee Ray, and the director of the National Science Foundation, H. Guyford 
Stever, to present a ten billion dollar investment program in energy research. 
During the press conference, a journalist asked “what share, first of oil, and 
secondly of energy use as a whole, [came] from Middle Eastern oil.” To his 
surprise nobody could give an answer, and Stever admitted that they did not 
know.32 As science- and expert-based approaches to policy making had gained 
wide currency at the time, the government’s lack of knowledge in oil and ener-
gy greatly contributed to its loss of credibility and the sense of insecurity dur-
ing the oil crisis. Ignorance seemed to make the government dependent on 
external information and, in the end, cast doubt on its ability to conduct politics 
in a sovereign manner.33 
At the root of insecurity during the oil crisis were the declarations by OPEC 
and OAPEC that destroyed well-established communicative routines, increased 
contingencies, and made it difficult to anticipate future actions and reactions.34 
Moreover, the data provided by the oil companies were regarded with growing 
suspicion as conspiracy theories flourished, suggesting that the multinationals 
orchestrated the crisis to increase prices and drive the independents out of the 
market.35 Therefore, demands grew stronger that the United States needed an 
independent agency to produce policy-relevant knowledge on energy.36 Si-
mon’s Federal Energy Office was supposed to reduce insecurity with weekly 
Petroleum Situation Reports, copying the industry information system.37 How-
ever, these reports had contradictory effects and contributed to the mounting 
sense of crisis. In December 1973, for example, Simon’s deputy, John Sawhill, 
appeared in front of the Senate Committee on Government Operations testifying 
on the expected decrease in oil supplies. When he said that he expected a shortfall 
of 3.27 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 1974, Democratic Senator 
Henry A. Jackson quoted seven different official assessments, ranging from 1.6 
to 3.5 million barrels per day, asking ironically, “Do you feel now that you have 
any more accurate means of making these estimates than we had earlier?”38  
Due to the lack of state expertise, external oil and energy experts provided 
data and knowledge to the administration. In general, the government presented 
its reliance on experts as an attempt to act on the best-available evidence. With 
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the rising importance of science and expertise in policy-making over the course 
of the twentieth century, the legitimacy of political power increasingly depend-
ed on its capacity to justify decisions scientifically. Yet, the scientification of 
politics posed problems, because expert opinions differed widely, even about 
the most basic issues concerning oil and energy, and the resulting conflicts 
called into question the legitimizing function of science for politics.39 Above 
all, experts disagreed whether the oil crisis reflected or at least foreshadowed a 
real shortage of oil or whether it was just the product of artificial interventions 
in an otherwise functioning market by both the producing countries’ and the 
United States’ governments.40 
Accordingly, there were two basic, yet fundamentally different strategies to 
overcome the energy crisis: increasing domestic oil/energy production or cur-
tailing demand. The National Petroleum Council, an advisory body to the De-
partment of the Interior that consisted of representatives of the oil industry, 
opted for the first solution. In 1972, its U.S. Energy Outlook predicted virtually 
no limits to domestic energy production from various sources.41 Even though 
its experts acknowledged the need for energy conservation in the private sector 
during the oil crisis, they still argued that only increased domestic production 
offered a long-term solution.42 By contrast, the Ford Foundation’s Energy 
Policy Project, which was led by David S. Freeman, reached the opposite con-
clusion. Its widely circulating report developed an “historical growth,” a “tech-
nical fix,” and a “zero energy growth” scenario for future energy use, arguing 
that the last scenario was mandatory to overcome the energy crisis.43 Generally 
speaking, the National Petroleum Council and Energy Policy Project were 
symptomatic for the state of energy expertise in the United States before and 
during the oil crisis. On one hand, experts working in the oil industry formulat-
ed recommendations that were clearly derived from their companies’ business 
interests. On the other hand, independent experts – often inspired by the envi-
ronmentalist movement – developed radically alternative energy futures.  
In this constellation, the events of 1973/74 created “urgency for data” and an 
incentive to augment governmental energy expertise.44 The first product of 
these efforts was the Project Independence Report, which was derived from 
Nixon’s pledge to make the United States energy independent by 1980. In 
1974, more than four hundred people from various government agencies and 
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institutions contributed to the report trying to project different energy futures 
and evaluate political strategies.45 Invented to reduce uncertainty and make the 
United States energy independent, Project Independence failed miserably, 
since the overall development of the energy sector depended heavily on the 
price of oil, and there was very little knowledge concerning the price elasticity 
of oil demand, which was consistently overestimated.46 Moreover, almost all 
contemporary energy experts – including those working on Project Independ-
ence – agreed that energy independence in the sense of autarchy was as illu-
sionary as it was undesirable.47 Yet, the sheer amount of intellectual and finan-
cial resources spent on energy prognoses to define and legitimize policies is 
significant in other respects. To begin with, it contributed to the emergence of 
“energy” as a coherent field of knowledge, political action, and debate. Moreo-
ver, the rhetoric of Project Independence emphasized a traditional notion of 
national sovereignty under new challenges and has been renewed by every US 
president since. Finally, the government undertook huge efforts to publicize its 
undertakings and involve the people.  
Between August and October 1974, the government discussed Project Inde-
pendence at ten public hearings in different parts of the country, inviting scien-
tists, businesses, lobbyists, and non-profit associations, along with local politi-
cians and individual citizens. Television spots demanded, “Today we need a 
new Project Independence: Energy Independence […] Be there and share in 
America’s Future.”48 More than a thousand individuals and organizations of-
fered their advice, and the transcripts of their statements and the ensuing de-
bates fill ten large volumes, totaling more than 6,700 pages.49 The hearings 
were supposed to invoke the impression that the government acted responsibly 
with the best available evidence and, yet, everybody could contribute to the 
formulation of America’s energy policy and the reassertion of its independ-
ence. At least the latter is highly questionable. The last hearing took place on 
October 12 and, only two months later, the Project Independence Report was 
published, whose complicated analytic scheme bore little resemblance to the 
heterogeneous and idiosyncratic statements that were made during the hearings. 
Yet, the enormous effort and the participation of high government officials 
suggest that the administration viewed the hearings at least as an important 
means of political communication. In terms of government strategies, Project 
Independence offered a seemingly paradoxical blend of technocracy and grass-
roots democracy as a means to bolster the government’s legitimacy. As a result 
of the growing interconnection between science and politics in the twentieth 
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century, the government had to demonstrate that it based its energy policies on 
scientific expertise. Yet, it also followed the expectations of a media democra-
cy and pretended that everyone could participate in the formulation of policy 
strategies. Both strategies had the common goal to bolster the government’s 
domestic position in the field of energy.  
4.  Communicating Sovereignty: “Nixon Doesn’t Practice 
What He Preaches” and “Simon Says…” 
As sovereignty is a social concept, its acceptance depends on the way it is 
communicated. From April 1973 to January 1974 Nixon gave five major 
speeches in order to claim and demonstrate sovereignty in the field of energy. 
Apart from the announcement of new government measures, Nixon’s energy 
addresses served a dual purpose. They were to induce energy conservation in 
order to improve the country’s fuel situation, which would in turn advance its 
international bargaining position. Moreover, they were designed to prove to the 
public at home and abroad that the president was still in charge and, despite 
Watergate, able to tackle the mounting energy problems. In April 1973, Nixon 
still refused to talk of an energy “crisis,” arguing that the nation was only fac-
ing “a vitally important energy challenge.”50 On November 7, 1973, however, 
Nixon declared in his “energy emergency address” that, because of the embar-
go, the challenge had turned into a “crisis.”51 Only three weeks later, Nixon 
maintained that the embargo had intensified the expected energy shortages and 
produced a “major energy crisis.”52 Finally, in his January speeches, Nixon 
further deemphasized the long-term domestic causes of the energy crisis while 
dramatizing the developments since October 1973. This rhetorical construction 
of a “crisis” heightened the sense of urgency and the need for political action. 
In general, “crisis” signifies an open situation in which a decision between two 
existentially different futures is pending.53 Thus, it constructs a situation in 
which political leaders can and have to prove their authority by bringing about 
the good and avoiding the bad option. 
When Nixon spoke about ways to overcome the energy crisis, he used no-
tions of individual sacrifice and morality, nationalism and national sovereignty 
– a language that also dominated the public discourse about energy. It is com-
                                                             
50  Office of the White House Press Secretary: To the Congress of the United States, 18 April 
1973, Nixon Library, WHCF, SMOF, EPO, Box 24. 
51  Office of the White House Press Secretary: Address by the President on the Energy Emer-
gency on Nationwide Radio and Television, 7 Nov. 1973, Nixon Library, WHCF, SMOF, EPO, 
Box 45. 
52  Energy Speech, November 25, 1973, Nixon Library, WHSF, Pres Pers Files, Box 89. 
53  Koselleck 1982. 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  54 
monly assumed that Jimmy Carter turned energy usage into a moral question 
with his famous “crisis of confidence” speech.54 Yet, already Nixon had de-
manded that the nation develop a national conservation ethic, arguing that 
energy consumption was the cornerstone against which both the nation’s great-
ness and the individual citizen’s morality had to be measured: “As a matter of 
simple prudence and common sense, we must not waste our resources, however 
abundant they may seem. To do otherwise, in a world of finite resources, re-
flects adversely upon what we are as a people and a Nation.”55 State-sponsored 
campaigns to encourage energy conservation further intensified the nationaliza-
tion and moralization of the debate with slogans like “Don’t Be Fuelish” or 
“SavEnergy.” Moral language continued to influence the national energy de-
bate, while the escalating Watergate scandal eroded the president’s credibility 
with the American public.56 
After the embargo was announced in October 1973, energy czar Love sug-
gested that Nixon should address the nation in a televised speech.57 Aware of 
the government’s credibility problem, the speech was held at 7:00 p.m., so that 
as many people as possible would hear and see Nixon in real time and not 
through a news summary. Moreover, a subsequent debate with Nixon’s energy 
advisors would demonstrate that the president consulted with competent and 
honorable experts.58 Following Herbert Stein’s idea, the overall governmental 
effort to overcome the energy crisis was called “Project Independence.” With 
the bicentennial celebrations of the Declaration of Independence approaching, 
the name would mark the vital importance of energy supplies for the nation’s 
sovereignty.59 In his speech, Nixon not only referred to the US independence of 
British rule, but also put energy challenges on par with the two biggest threats 
to US sovereignty in the twentieth century: the Second World War and the 
Cold War. He announced: 
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[A]n endeavor that in this bicentennial era we can appropriately call ‘Project 
Independence.’ Let us set as our national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the 
determination of the Manhattan Project, that by the end of this decade we will 
have developed the potential to meet our own energy needs without depending 
on foreign energy sources.60 
In order to realize this goal, Nixon demanded voluntary energy conservation 
from everybody and claimed that he would set an example by lowering the 
thermostats in the White House.61 The moral challenge of the oil crisis was, 
thus, directed at the government, as much as at the citizens.  
However, Nixon’s speech was received differently than intended. Most of 
the commentators argued that voluntary measures alone would be insufficient 
to solve the problem. Moreover, Watergate had cast its shadow. The NBC 
White House correspondent claimed that the speech had been made after long 
debates over whether it was not too obvious of an attempt to divert attention 
from Watergate.62 In the New York Times, Edward Cowan even claimed that 
Nixon’s speech had two goals: “to tackle the substance of the energy problem 
and to show himself to the public as a president who has not been rendered 
politically impotent by the Watergate controversy.”63 With this explication and 
the criticism of Nixon’s “belated awakening,” the New York Times undermined 
its strategy. In politics and Congress, however, Nixon’s speech had produced a 
paradoxical situation: many politicians were willing to augment the president’s 
authority in the energy arena, as proposed in the Emergency Energy Act, while 
simultaneously questioning Nixon’s legitimacy in general.64 
The moral approach publicly backfired when Nixon addressed the nation 
again less than three weeks later in another energy speech that announced fur-
ther conservation measures.65 These new demands for energy conservation 
struck a strange chord with many CBS viewers after Dan Rather introduced 
Nixon’s speech with this remark: “The president will speak about the energy 
crisis, after he returned from Camp David Maryland Mountain Retreat by heli-
copter.”66 Nixon’s allegedly excessive air travel had already been subject to 
considerable public debate. Now, even local newspapers, such as the Hamilton 
Ohio Journal News, stoked the debate by providing information about the fuel 
consumption of helicopters and planes to the public: “The truth is that the pres-
ident and his aides haven’t been practicing the austerity they have been preach-
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ing. He drafted his public appeal in balmy Key Biscane, FL. […]. His luxury 
jet burned 8,000 gallons of fuel to make the round trip.”67 Many citizens were 
furious, such as Ruth S. from Hamilton, Ohio, who cut out the article and sent 
it to the White House complaining that the government could not expect the 
people to obey rules they themselves neglected.68 The New York Times and the 
Washington Post also deplored Nixon’s double standards and the corresponding 
lack of presidential leadership in a time of crisis. According to one commentator, 
“The nation’s most critical energy gap today is in the White House.”69 Nixon’s 
aides reacted to the public uproar with a PR coup when the president took a 
scheduled flight to California shortly after Christmas 1973.70 Even though the 
press coverage of Nixon’s flight was positive, it could not fundamentally change 
the public critique of the president’s energy consumption habits.  
Due to Nixon’s involvement in Watergate and the severe doubts about his 
integrity, the real and discursive space for alternative political leaders grew. 
Bill Simon, in particular, emerged as both the crucial energy policy maker and 
an important reference point for the media discussion of the energy crisis. 
Despite the fact that Simon always presented himself as the President’s most 
devoted follower, he was soon depicted as the upright and sincere opposite of 
the morally questionable Nixon. In January 1974, he even made the cover of 
TIME magazine, which celebrated his rise: “Simon in the past month has be-
come one of the most powerful and visible figures in a Government starved for 
leadership.”71 According to TIME, Simon’s credibility resulted from his alleg-
edly exceptional work ethic, which juxtaposed him with a president troubled by 
Watergate. The magazine described Simon as “a decisive policymaker and 
superbly organized administrator” who had created a “superagency” of “young, 
eager troubleshooters” with whom he worked ceaselessly to overcome the 
energy crisis.72 Even his private life seemed to be impeccable when stories 
depicted Simon, his wife, and his seven children as the ideal energy-conserving 
family.73 In the winter of 1973 and 1974 Simon was almost omnipresent in the 
                                                             
67  Anderson 1973. See also the debate of Nixon’s energy use in: Office of the White House 
Press Secretary: Press Conference of John A. Love and Charles DiBona, June 29, 1973, Nixon 
Library, WHCF, SMOF, EPO, Box 24. 
68  Nixon Library, WHCF, SMOF, EPO, Box 7, Folder, 1-43. The extensive public opinion mail is 
collected in Nixon Library, WHCF, SMOF, EPO, Boxes 6-17.  
69  ‘Energy Gap…’ 1973; see also Baker 1973; Cowan 1973a; Kraft 1973; Smith 1973. 
70  Cannon 1973b; Herbers 1973; ‘Nixon Feels Flight to Coast on Commercial Plane 'Scored 
Points'’ 1973. 
71  ‘The Whirlwind’1974, 24. 
72  Ibid., 25. 
73  ‘A Fitzgerald Hero’ 1974. 
HSR 39 (2014) 4  │  57 
media, and the children’s game “Simon says…” acquired a new meaning when 
the band The Energizers sang, “(Save Our Energy) That’s What Simon Says.”74 
Whereas the oil crisis put into question the government’s sovereignty, the 
Nixon administration simultaneously tried to use the crisis as an opportunity to 
reaffirm its authority and demonstrate its capacity to lead. Yet its efforts to 
moralize and nationalize the energy crisis were not very successful. Nixon’s 
approval rating dropped from sixty-eight percent in January 1973 to twenty-
seven percent in October and did not change significantly for the rest of his 
presidency.75 Watergate had demolished his credibility so thoroughly that he 
could not even invoke the impression that he lived up to his own standards 
anymore. This predicament enabled the rise of Bill Simon as a Nixon-devoted 
anti-Nixon. Simon and other experts created a double bind for Nixon. On one 
hand, Nixon needed seemingly trustworthy and competent advisers to support 
his authority. On the other hand, they made him look bad in comparison. How-
ever, apparently even someone as media savvy as Simon could not reestablish 
the people’s trust in their government.76 According to a Gallup poll in Decem-
ber 1973, only six percent of the Americans believed that the Arab nations 
were responsible for the oil crisis, twenty-five percent blamed the oil compa-
nies, twenty-three percent the federal government, nineteen percent the Nixon 
administration, and sixteen percent the American consumers.77 
5.  Strength and Cooperation: Maintaining International 
Sovereignty 
In the acute oil crisis of 1973/74, the most concrete attack to US sovereignty 
was the Arab oil embargo and production cuts, which were supposed to force 
the government to change its policy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
embargo challenged US international sovereignty to a much greater extent than 
the economically more important price hikes. Since America’s European allies 
were affected by the production cuts, the oil crisis also tested the stability of the 
Atlantic alliance and US hegemony in the West. As giving in to economic 
pressure would have resulted in a considerable loss of sovereignty and the 
military option was excluded, there remained three different strategies: first, 
bilateral negotiations with the producing countries; second, the formation of a 
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consumer block against the producers; and, third, a multilateral approach in-
volving both producing and consuming countries. Bilateral and multilateral 
strategies had different implications for the assertion of sovereignty, which the 
contemporaries discussed intensively. Like most other consuming countries, 
the US government pursued a mixture of all three strategies. However, it put a 
surprisingly strong emphasis on consumer cooperation, even though this im-
plied the sacrifice of some sovereign rights.  
By the time of the declaration of the embargo, Henry A. Kissinger was pri-
marily responsible for the conduct of US foreign policy.78 While he was admit-
tedly not versed in oil and energy matters, Kissinger had a very clear concep-
tion of the consequences of the oil crisis for sovereignty and power politics. 
When his advisers explained that the United States was far less dependent on 
Middle Eastern oil than its European allies, Kissinger concluded that “we might 
even turn this crisis into a certain kind of an asset, if we could take a leadership 
position.”79 After the beginning of the Yom Kippur War, Kissinger mainly tried 
to establish a peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, because 
he thought that a solution of the oil crisis would automatically follow suit. With 
respect to oil, American diplomacy pursued a twofold goal. First, the embargo 
should end as soon as possible, and the future increase in Middle Eastern pro-
duction in accordance with American needs had to be secured. Secondly, a rift 
between the United States and its more energy dependent European and Asian 
allies had to be avoided and US hegemony maintained. The latter was particu-
larly important to Kissinger who, above all, wanted to prevent an expansion of 
Soviet influence in the Middle East.80 
While the administration tried to expand its authority over energy matters 
domestically, Kissinger also eliminated voices that might have interfered with 
his sovereign conduct of foreign policy. This concerned, for example, big oil 
companies, such as Mobil, Socal or Texaco, which, at King Faisal’s suggestion, 
had warned the American public and politicians that US oil supplies might be 
threatened if the government did not alter its policies towards the Near East.81 
In Kissinger’s view, it was outrageous that “political idiots” like the oil compa-
nies might compromise his diplomatic efforts.82 Therefore, he told their chair-
men that they should leave the conduct of US foreign policy to him and just tell 
their “Arab friends” that he was putting all his efforts towards achieving peace 
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in the region, but would not give in to pressure.83 This was, indeed, Kissinger’s 
position in the negotiations with the Arab oil-producing countries – most im-
portantly with Saudi Arabia, which, due to its vast reserves, was essential for 
the future US and world oil supply and any meaningful oil embargo.84 Talking 
with King Faisal, Kissinger repeatedly emphasized that the United States could 
easily withstand the embargo, and, even if it were hit, as a matter of principle and 
national sovereignty it would not change its policies.85 When sovereignty was 
under attack, Kissinger clearly realized, making a self-assured claim was the first 
step to securing it. However, in the delicate communicative situation of the em-
bargo, assuming a position of strength could be counterproductive if it encour-
aged the Arab countries to implement harsher measures.86 Therefore, with some 
notable exceptions, Kissinger avoided public allusions to retaliatory measures.87  
Over the course of the embargo, Kissinger sometimes saw his strategy of 
strength undermined by Nixon’s wish to end the embargo as soon as possible, 
in order to prove his capacity to act and boost his popularity. In November, 
Kissinger advised not to invite King Faisal to Washington because it “would be 
interpreted throughout Arab world as collapse,” and “magnify, not reduce, 
Arab incentives to keep pressure on US via oil weapon.”88 In mid-January, he 
became increasingly annoyed by the President’s desire for what he saw as 
“tawdry PR gains” and wrote angrily to Brent Scowcroft that  
we have gotten where we have in this exercise by dealing from (or appearing 
to deal from) a position of strength. Should the president now indicate to the 
Arabs the vital importance to the [United States] and to him of ending the oil 
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embargo – and ending it with an announcement from Washington – we will 
give strength to the Arabs in their determination to deal with us harshly.89 
However, after the Arab leaders had indicated to him that they were willing to 
lift the embargo soon, Kissinger worked with Nixon on the most effective way 
to frame this news in the President’s State of the Union address.90  
As these episodes show, Kissinger realized that, in international politics, ap-
pearing to be sovereign and being sovereign are closely related, if not essential-
ly the same. However, US sovereignty had to be maintained in negotiations not 
only with both oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. Since the European 
allies and Japan were far more dependent on oil from the Middle East and 
North Africa, they were less inclined than Kissinger to assume a position of 
strength against the producing countries. Moreover, the different classification 
of the European countries with respect to the production cuts made it difficult 
to find a common position within the European Communities (EC). Govern-
ments of “friendly” and “neutral” countries, such as France or Great Britain, 
feared losing their privileged positions when expressing solidarity with the 
“hostile” Netherlands. All countries pursued bilateral negotiations with the 
producing countries and could only agree upon a common declaration that 
supported a peace settlement on the basis of UN-resolution 242. This was 
widely considered a pro-Arab move and criticized as a submission to black-
mail, leading to a loss of international sovereignty.91 Kissinger was furious 
about the European initiative for two reasons. On one hand, it undermined his 
peace efforts, showing that the embargo actually had an effect. Angrily, he 
tried to convince his European colleagues that a peace settlement would soon 
end the embargo, provided that the West showed no weakness and ended the 
“blatant show of disunity.”92 On the other hand, the declaration was the first 
assumption of a common European (EC) foreign policy stance, an effect of the 
only recently intensified European Political Cooperation.93 While Kissinger had 
named 1973 the “Year of Europe,” in which transatlantic cooperation was to be 
strengthened, the Europeans intensified their collaboration independently of the 
United States. In a time of détente, the European allies were, apparently, more 
worried about their oil supplies than about the expansion of Soviet influence. 
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Even the West German government risked conflict with the US over the ship-
ment of weapons from American military bases in Germany to Israel, because 
it was afraid of a termination of Libyan oil deliveries.94 
In this delicate constellation, Kissinger and Nixon invited the major oil pro-
ducing countries to an energy conference. In an internal meeting, Kissinger 
explained his goals: to form a consumer organization in order to bargain with 
the producers more effectively, to undermine European cooperation that ex-
cluded the United States, and to destroy the “sense of panicky impotence” that 
the Europeans conveyed.95 At the Washington Energy Conference in mid-
February 1974, unilateral and multilateral visions of how to secure sovereignty 
in an increasingly globalized – in contemporary words “interdependent” – 
world clashed. Kissinger purported that he did not “dispute the right of sover-
eign nations to make individual arrangements” with the producing countries 
but, due to increasing economic interdependence, unrestricted uni- or bilateral-
ism would be detrimental to everybody. The central question was thus, “Will 
we consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry which the realities of interde-
pendence make suicidal? Or will we acknowledge our interdependence and 
shape cooperative solutions?”96 Thus, he called for an institutionalized coordi-
nation of the energy policies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. 
While most countries acknowledged the need to cooperate, the French govern-
ment remained obstinate, describing Kissinger’s suggestion as a means to se-
cure American hegemony.97 According to the French Foreign Minister Michel 
Jobert, the name “Project Independence” betrayed the real intentions of the US 
government. He was enraged by what he perceived as the failure of his Europe-
an colleagues to maintain a common front and suggested continuing with bilat-
eral negotiations until a conference of both consuming and producing countries 
would find a cooperative solution.  
In general, there is much to the French suspicion that the US policy was not 
driven by the desire for cooperation, but rather by its national interest. This is 
particular obvious as all attempts to develop larger cooperative schemes includ-
ing the producing countries – be it within the United Nations in the General 
Assembly’s Sixth Special Session in April/May 1974 or the Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation, which was sponsored by the French gov-
ernment – failed, not the least because of the United States’ and other industri-
alized countries’ reluctance to give up economic privileges. Yet, despite the 
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limits of the American willingness to cooperate and the instrumentalization of 
the Washington Conference to re-affirm its hegemony, the results of the con-
ference and its follow-up process are significant for a history of sovereignty. 
With the foundation of the International Energy Agency, the US government 
agreed to participate in an oil-sharing mechanism that was automatically im-
plemented if one country’s supplies fell below a certain threshold and could 
only be suspended by a qualified majority of all countries.98 Thus, the United 
States voluntarily sacrificed certain sovereign rights in the energy field in order 
to maintain energy security and stabilize the transatlantic alliance – that is, to 
maintain sovereignty in more meaningful ways. Even for the United States, 
maintaining energy security and, thus, economic and political sovereignty 
implied international cooperation – a fact that was only partly obscured by the 
nationalistic rhetoric of Project Independence and its claim the country would 
become energy independent by 1980. 
Many contemporary political scientists have argued that increasing econom-
ic interdependence necessitated closer cooperation in international organiza-
tions and rendered the pursuit of unilateral, sovereign, hegemonic power poli-
tics obsolete.99 Under the impression of the oil crisis, even hardcore realists, 
such as Herman Kahn or Hans J. Morgenthau, reconsidered their assumptions 
about world politics and diagnosed the rise of a multi-polar world in which the 
United States’ capacity to conduct foreign policy would be more narrowly 
circumscribed by other powers.100 Yet, the hegemonic view that increasing 
interdependence would impede sovereign power politics was by no means 
consensual. For Robert Tucker, not more interdependence but more independ-
ence offered the solution to the energy crisis. In the conservative magazine 
Commentary, he advocated for an American intervention in the Gulf region and 
attributed the government’s cooperative strategy to “political incompetence and 
the failure of will.”101 This view of a world in which the great powers unilater-
ally determine their fate, even with military means, resonated later with the so-
called new sovereigntists in the 1990s, who claimed that the United States 
should not be bound by international norms and treatises.102  
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6.  Conclusion  
The Arab oil embargo and production cuts in October 1973 challenged the 
international sovereignty of the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries. While it had to be countered in the international arena, the challenge 
could not be met by diplomatic means alone. Connecting international and 
domestic politics, the concept of sovereignty allows us to scrutinize the close 
interaction between two realms that are often treated separately. Already the 
energy supply problems that had emerged before the oil crisis produced the 
widespread conviction that, despite numerous interventions into the energy 
sector, the US government was ill-equipped to conduct sovereign energy poli-
cy, as it lacked competence, centralized institutions, and expertise. Under the 
external pressure of the oil embargo the quest for a transformation of US ener-
gy policy accelerated and was couched in a language of “independence” and 
“sovereignty.” While focused on domestic changes, Project Independence was 
also designed to improve the country’s international sovereignty and avoid 
future embargoes. American diplomats referred to it in their negotiations with 
producing countries, maintaining that the United States would soon need no 
foreign oil anymore. Conversely, the threat to US international sovereignty was 
used domestically in order to legitimize political changes. That interdepend-
ence sovereignty was limited, in the sense that the government could not guar-
antee the sufficient influx of oil, was an argument to both encourage conserva-
tion and increase domestic production.  
Understanding sovereignty not as a property that states can have or not have, 
but as a claim they make and try to vindicate against other powers highlights 
these connections and emphasizes the symbolic dimension of the material 
conflict over energy resources. After decades in which rising affluence had 
helped to legitimize Western democracies in the global conflict of the Cold 
War and higher living standards had been equated with higher energy and, 
above all, oil consumption, the prospect of scarcer oil resources or their control 
by rulers in remote countries who could not easily be influenced was highly 
worrisome and affected the core of the state. For how long would the govern-
ment be recognized as internationally and domestically sovereign if it could not 
cope with the energy challenge? A flood of letters to the Energy Policy Office 
and the White House documents the disruptive potential of the energy crisis for 
a highly mobile society.103 Because of the social and communicative dimension 
of the concept, government measures were not only designed to maintain sov-
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ereignty but also to demonstrate that the government maintained its sovereign-
ty. The centralization of competences, the development of state expertise, Pro-
ject Independence, and the foundation of the International Energy Agency were 
designed to prove that the government was independent and in charge. 
Not the least due to their largely symbolic function, the success of the Nixon 
administration’s sovereignty strategies is difficult to ascertain. The institutional 
reorganization and centralization of the widely dispersed energy competences 
turned out to be tedious and incomplete, producing power conflicts and not 
eliminating the public suspicion that political mismanagement was responsible 
for the energy crisis. Satisfying demands for government expertise proved to be 
equally difficult, as experts generally contradicted each other, but were united 
on one point: energy independence was no viable solution in an increasingly 
globalized economy. Even diplomatic attempts to establish the autonomy of US 
foreign policy and its hegemony in the West were more difficult than expected, 
as OPEC countries turned out be resilient and the allies difficult to bring in 
line. In the end, energy security and, thus, national sovereignty could only be 
achieved by cooperating closely with other consuming and at least some pro-
ducing countries. Despite the sacrifice of certain sovereign rights, however, the 
international cooperation that led to the creation of the International Energy 
Agency increased, not decreased, national sovereignty.104  
If we treat sovereignty as a claim and not property, the first oil crisis does 
not easily fit into the grand narratives of sovereignty’s rise and demise. It sup-
ports neither claims that it marked the early end of the “American Century” nor 
the beginning of America’s decline.105 Rather, the oil crisis appears as a com-
plex set of events in which many important conflicts of the time crossed and 
which, therefore, could be used in order to support various claims about sover-
eignty. Economists and representatives of the oil industry saw it as evidence 
that the states should withdraw from the economy; environmentalists conceived 
it as foreshadowing a time in which scarce resources would limit state sover-
eignty; for some political scientists, it was the end of hegemony and the break-
through of international cooperation, while others saw it as an incentive to 
claim sovereignty more forcefully. This discursive polyvalence ensured the oil 
crisis’ lasting significance and simultaneously proved that the notion of sover-
eignty had, contrary to the prognoses of many contemporaries, not become 
obsolete as a claim governments make and try to defend against all challenges. 
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105 Ferguson 2010; Bacevich 2008. 
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